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# White-Hat Penetration Test — Plan & Engagement (TRU-80)
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**Linear:** [TRU-80 — DRIFT 19: White hat pen test (security review)](https://linear.app/truck-wash-aps/issue/TRU-80/drift-19-white-hat-pen-test-security-review)
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**Project:** UI Library & Pen Testing
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**Priority:** Medium
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**Status (this doc):** Draft v1 — ready for engineering + management review
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**Author:** bugfix sub-agent (TRU-80)
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**Date:** 2026-08-16
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---
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## 1. Purpose
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Define the scope, methodology, deliverables, scheduling, and budget envelope for an
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independent white-hat penetration test of the Truck Wash ApS platform. The engagement
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is intended to validate the security posture of the customer- and operator-facing
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production stack before further public rollout and ahead of any major commercial
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expansion (e.g. additional self-serve sites, additional payment integrations).
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This document is the planning artefact for TRU-80. It does **not** itself perform
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or simulate a pen test — it specifies the engagement so that an external vendor can
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be selected and contracted.
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---
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## 2. Scope (in)
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The following systems are **in scope** for the engagement. Coverage is **production
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stack only** (no staging is exposed for pen-test unless explicitly noted).
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### 2.1 API (PHP / NGINX, `copenhagentruckwash/api`)
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- All HTTP(S) routes under `services/nginx/app/routes/` (≈116 route files) and
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`services/nginx/app/modules/*/routes/` (multiple modules incl. Stripe, Limble,
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Scanner, Self-Serve Studio, Edge Gateway, Bird Control Plane, etc.).
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- Authentication / session endpoints, including:
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- `usersRoute.php`, `userSecurityRoute.php`, `superuserSecurityRoute.php`,
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`subusersRoute.php`, `limitedBackofficeRoute.php`
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- `limitedBackofficeLoginGrantService.php` and the backoffice grant flow
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- Authorization model: role-based access (customer / sub-user / backoffice /
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superuser) and per-customer data isolation.
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- Customer & invoice routes: `customerNotes`, `customerDefaultDepartmentRoute`,
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`customerCodeDepartmentRoute`, wash certificate, vehicle plate lookup,
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collected-invoices, order routes.
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- Payment integration: Stripe module (`moduleStripeRoute.php`).
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- Economic ERP integration (`economic_endpoint_t.php` trait) — read-only
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token handling, invoice push.
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- Edge gateway / IoT surface: `moduleEdgeGatewayRoute.php`, `edgegateway.php`,
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`shelly.php`, `gateway_shelly_transport.php`, `birdControlPlaneRoute.php`.
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- File / media endpoints: `file_server.php` (auth-gated downloads, S3 / local).
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- Rate limiting, CORS, CSRF, JWT / session cookie handling, and the underlying
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Redis trait (`redis_t.php`).
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- WordPress trait / integration (`wordpress_api_object_t.php`) — only as far as
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our code consumes it; the upstream WP instance is **out of scope** unless
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hosted by us.
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- Container/infrastructure: `Dockerfile`, `Dockerfile.coolify-api`, NGINX
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config (`nginx.conf`, `apache-ssl.conf`), `docker-compose.prod.yml`,
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`coolify` deploy config. Black-box reachable attack surface only.
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### 2.2 Pleno-Vue (Vue 3 + Capacitor, `copenhagentruckwash/pleno-vue`)
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- Web SPA (`app/`, `index.html`, `dist/`) reachable at the production hostname.
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- Mobile builds for Android (`android/`, `build.gradle`, `fastlane/`) and iOS
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(`ios/`) packaged via Capacitor (`capacitor.config.ts`).
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- API client and token storage in the SPA (where tokens live, at-rest
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protection, refresh flow).
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- Build-time secrets, env handling (`env.d.ts`, `manifest-checksum.txt`,
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`Gemfile` if used for asset signing), the public OpenAPI spec committed at
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the root (`openapi.yaml`).
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- Capacitor deep-link / universal-link / custom-scheme handling
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(`capacitor.config.ts`).
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### 2.3 Infrastructure & cross-cutting (in)
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- TLS configuration (cert chain, HSTS, cipher suites) on the production
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public host.
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- HTTP security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy,
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Permissions-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options).
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- Subdomain / wildcard exposure (`*.truckwash.dk` style).
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- Email & SMS notification paths only as far as they can be abused for
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spoofing / phishing of our users (we control the From domain).
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### 2.4 Out of scope (explicitly)
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- Upstream SaaS providers' own infrastructure: Stripe, Economic, WordPress.com,
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Shelly cloud, Limble, Mailgun, etc. We will only test the **integration**,
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not the third party itself.
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- Internal office LAN, employee laptops, MDT, and physical site hardware
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(gate controllers, scanners) — these are covered by a separate physical /
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OT scope and **out of scope** for this IT pen test.
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- Denial-of-service / load testing.
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- Social engineering of Truck Wash staff.
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- Source-code review of `node_modules` / vendor dependencies (the engagement
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will use SCA tooling to flag known CVEs, but not audit transitive deps).
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- Any production data exfiltration — the vendor will be given sanitised or
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test accounts and synthetic data only.
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---
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## 3. Methodology
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Industry-standard, manual-led engagement with tooling support. Recommended
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methodology base: **OWASP ASVS** level 2 (with a stretch goal of level 3 on
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auth + payment) and **OWASP WSTG** for the web/API surface. Mobile builds will
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use **OWASP MASVS** as the checklist.
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Phases (estimated total: 12 working days of vendor effort, see §6):
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1. **Scoping & recon (1 day)**
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- Confirm target list, accounts, and rules of engagement.
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- Passive recon (DNS, cert transparency, subdomains, public OpenAPI spec).
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- Active recon limited to non-destructive fingerprinting.
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2. **API pen test (3 days)**
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- AuthN/AuthZ boundary testing on every route group in §2.1.
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- IDOR / BOLA testing on customer-scoped resources (invoices, plates,
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wash certificates, sub-users, customer notes).
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- Input validation: SQLi, command injection, SSRF, XXE, path traversal,
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deserialisation, header injection.
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- Business-logic abuse: free-wash flow, refund / credit flow, coupon /
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discount stacking, sub-user privilege escalation.
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- Webhook signature validation (Stripe, Edge Gateway, Shelly).
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3. **Web SPA pen test (2 days)**
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- XSS (reflected, stored, DOM-based) including Vue template injection.
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- Token storage, leakage via 3rd-party scripts, postMessage abuse.
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- Open-redirect / OAuth misconfig in any SSO flow.
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- CSP / SRI effectiveness.
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4. **Mobile (Capacitor) review (2 days)**
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- Static analysis of the built APK / IPA (Capacitor WebView).
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- Insecure WebView settings (`allowFileAccess`, `MixedContentMode`,
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custom-scheme handlers).
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- Local storage of tokens, biometric bypass if implemented.
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- Deep-link / universal-link hijack attempts.
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5. **Infrastructure & config (1.5 days)**
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- TLS, headers, cookie flags, HSTS preload eligibility.
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- NGINX hardening review (based on provided config snapshots).
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- Docker / coolify surface only as externally reachable.
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6. **SCA / dependency check (0.5 day)**
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- `composer.json` and `package.json` SCA scan.
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- High-severity known-CVE report only; no deep audit.
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7. **Exploitation & PoC (1 day)**
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- Build proofs-of-concept for any Critical / High findings.
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8. **Reporting & re-test (1 day)**
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- Draft report → vendor walkthrough → final report.
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- Re-test of fixed findings is scoped separately (see §6).
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---
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## 4. Rules of engagement (RoE)
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- **Window:** business hours Europe/Copenhagen by default; out-of-hours
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exploitation only with prior written approval per critical finding.
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- **Contact channel:** shared Signal thread + email; vendor given a Slack
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guest account in a dedicated `#sec-pentest-2026Q4` channel.
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- **Stop conditions:** any finding that risks data loss, payment integrity,
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or production gate operation → immediate stop + phone call to on-call.
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- **Data handling:** vendor may only use synthetic / test data. No
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exfiltration of real customer PII. All artifacts returned or destroyed at
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end of engagement (TBD in contract).
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- **Coverage of third parties:** the vendor will not test Stripe / Economic
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/ Shelly / Limble directly; if a third-party vulnerability is suspected,
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we follow responsible-disclosure to the vendor ourselves.
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---
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## 5. Deliverables
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1. **Kick-off doc** (this plan, signed off by both parties).
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2. **Daily standup notes** in `#sec-pentest-2026Q4` (one paragraph + new
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findings list).
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3. **Mid-engagement check-in** at end of phase 3 — informal review of any
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Critical / High so we can start patching in parallel.
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4. **Final report (PDF + JSON)** including:
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- Executive summary, risk heatmap, business-impact narrative.
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- Each finding: title, CVSS v3.1, affected asset, steps to reproduce,
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screenshots / Burp session, recommended fix, references.
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- SCA dependency report as an appendix.
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5. **Re-test letter** (separate SOW, see §6).
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6. **Knowledge transfer**: 60-min session for engineering on the top 5
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findings.
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---
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## 6. Budget & scheduling
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### 6.1 Indicative effort
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| Phase | Days | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| 1. Scoping & recon | 1.0 | joint with us |
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| 2. API pen test | 3.0 | |
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| 3. Web SPA | 2.0 | |
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| 4. Mobile (Capacitor) | 2.0 | |
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| 5. Infra & config | 1.5 | |
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| 6. SCA | 0.5 | tooling-led |
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| 7. Exploitation / PoC | 1.0 | |
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| 8. Reporting | 1.0 | incl. 1 review round |
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| **Total** | **12.0 days** | |
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### 6.2 Indicative cost (DKK, ex. VAT)
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Pricing varies significantly with vendor. Three realistic budget tiers for
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procurement:
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| Tier | Daily rate (DKK) | Total (12 d) | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Boutique / Nordic boutique (e.g. Danish / Swedish) | 12 000 – 16 000 | **144 000 – 192 000** | Best fit for our stack size, Danish-language reporting available. |
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| Mid-tier international (e.g. NCC, Securix, Pentest People) | 15 000 – 22 000 | **180 000 – 264 000** | More brand name, more bureaucracy, stronger report templates. |
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| Top-tier / Big-4 style | 25 000 – 40 000 | **300 000 – 480 000** | Overkill for current footprint; revisit at Series-A. |
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**Recommended envelope: 180 000 – 220 000 DKK** (mid-tier, 12 days) plus a
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**re-test retainer of ~25 000 DKK** (1 day, scheduled 30 days after final
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report).
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Add ~5 000 DKK contingency for incident-response hours if a Critical is
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found mid-engagement.
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### 6.3 Schedule (proposed)
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- **2026-08-25** — this plan reviewed and signed off by management.
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- **2026-08-26 → 2026-09-08** — vendor RFP: shortlist 3 vendors, request
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proposals, evaluate.
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- **2026-09-09 → 2026-09-15** — contract + NDA + RoE finalisation.
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- **2026-09-22 (week 39)** — engagement kick-off.
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- **2026-09-22 → 2026-10-07** — on-site / remote testing (2.5 calendar
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weeks, vendor working in parallel with their normal cadence).
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- **2026-10-08** — draft report.
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- **2026-10-15** — final report + walkthrough.
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- **2026-11-15** — re-test (retainer).
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All dates are **provisional** until a vendor is selected.
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### 6.4 Vendor shortlist (candidates to approach)
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We will request proposals from at least 3 of the following (final shortlist
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to be confirmed with management):
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1. **Securix** (DK) — boutique, OWASP ASVS-aligned, good fit for our size.
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2. **Pentest People** (UK / EU) — mid-tier, mobile capability.
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3. **NCC Group / nCC / NowSecure** (international) — heavier, good brand
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for enterprise due-diligence.
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4. **Curity** (SE) — strong API / OAuth expertise, fits our auth model.
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5. **Deutsche Cyber AG / similar Nordic boutique** — fallback.
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Procurement will evaluate on: relevant references (Logistics / IoT / payment),
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ASVS/MASVS familiarity, daily rate, lead time, report quality, re-test terms.
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---
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## 7. Pre-engagement hardening checklist (for engineering, run in parallel)
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We should land these before the vendor starts — they reduce noise and let
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the vendor focus on real issues:
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- [ ] HSTS preload submitted; `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload`
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- [ ] CSP `default-src 'self'` baseline, no `unsafe-inline`; report-only first
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- [ ] All cookies `Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax` (or `Strict` for backoffice)
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- [ ] CSRF token on every state-changing route; verified for Stripe / Edge
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Gateway webhooks
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- [ ] Webhook signature verification on Stripe, Shelly, Edge Gateway
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- [ ] Rate-limit on auth, password reset, and OTP endpoints
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- [ ] Sub-user privilege model re-verified against `subusersRoute.php`
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- [ ] File-server (`file_server.php`) path-traversal tests in CI
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- [ ] SCA in CI: `composer audit` and `npm audit --omit=dev` blocking
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high+ vulns
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- [ ] Mobile: `allowFileAccess=false`, mixed content disabled, JS interfaces
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removed
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- [ ] Secrets: no production keys in repo (`git log -S` audit)
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This list is also the basis for re-test acceptance criteria.
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---
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## 8. Open questions for management
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1. Confirm total budget cap (recommend ≤ 220 000 DKK + 25 000 retainer).
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2. Confirm legal/procurement owner and contract template.
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3. Confirm whether to require a Danish-language final report (recommended).
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4. Confirm re-test budget is approved up-front, or per-finding.
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5. Confirm we are comfortable with the 12-day estimate, or want a lighter
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6-day "API + SPA only" first pass.
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---
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## 9. References
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- OWASP ASVS 4.0 — https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/
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- OWASP WSTG — https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/
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- OWASP MASVS — https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/
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- OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) — https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/
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- Linear project: *UI Library & Pen Testing* (`acc087b4-b8ce-40c4-bbca-077fd93513a4`)
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---
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*This document is a planning artefact, not the test itself. Once approved, a
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separate SOW will be drafted with the selected vendor and linked from this
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issue.*
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